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Abstract  
In times of austerity, gentrification is promoted as a prime investment opportunity 
capable of reviving stagnating local economies. In Athens, pro-gentrification policies 
(using English slogans like ‘Re-launch Athens’ and ‘Re-activate Athens’) have become 
increasingly defined in their targeting of specific areas. Moreover, planning in Greece is 
characterized by spontaneity, fragmentation and tolerance of speculation, specifically 
favouring the gentrification process. In many cases, the state’s ‘absence’ after 
promulgation of regeneration projects acts as a clear strategy for inner-city 
gentrification. After discussing the emergent relations between state policies on urban 
intervention and gentrification in the post-crash era, this article will focus on the 
peculiarities of the Greek planning system and how these have led to the gentrification 
of an inner-city area called Metaxourgio.  
 Introduction  
Gentrification is an urban process related to emerging investment opportunities, spatial 
displacement and dispossession of the vulnerable (Harvey, 1989; Smith, 1996; Slater, 
2006; Lees, 2008; 2012). State intervention is key to this urban expression of creative 
destruction (Schumpeter, 1942) merely by its support of the process, essentially 
creating a revanchist strategy of urbanism (Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Smith, 2002). 
In times of crisis, when state dismantling is accompanied by increased intervention in 
spatial restructuring (Smith, 2002) and public order (Tonkiss, 2013), gentrification may 
be especially favoured (Hackworth and Smith, 2001). Indeed, systemic crises only serve 
to create grounds for yet more gentrification, acting as a constitutive element of 
contemporary capitalism, its commodity-based housing systems and neighbourhoods 
(Davidson, 2011).  
In Athens since 2010, austerity has been expressed by loss of sovereignty or, to 
paraphrase Swyngedouw (2005), an upwards rescaling of the state in favour of the 
European Union, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank (commonly 
known as ‘the troika’). A fall in incomes, withdrawal of welfare support and soaring 
unemployment have been accompanied by dispossession of public assets and land 
(Hadjimichalis, 2014). Within this framework, gentrification is transforming a landscape 
of former working-class neighbourhoods into a series of entertainment playgrounds, 
producing new settings for the alternative hype of the city. Although it has been stated 
that there are urban policies dealing (implicitly or explicitly) with gentrification in this 
context (Leontidou, 2014: 553), other research sees the situation differently, claiming 
that Athens is ‘ungentrifiable’ on account of a lack of clear-cut state intervention 
(Maloutas, 2007; Karachalis and Defner, 2012).  
This article develops evidence for the suggestion that gentrification occurs even in the 
case of ‘absent’ state intervention. The non-action or indeed the abstract action of the 
state comprises, in Bauman’s (2000a) terms, a liquid strategy promoting gentrification, 
tolerating speculation and overlooking displacement. In Athens, gentrification has 
emerged from the fractures of a spasmodic planning system- a system in which 
politically networked social groups and the elite are able to change the planning 
framework and impose their own rhythms upon space production.  
Focusing on the way planning policies have shaped the city centre and specifically their 
vague implementation in an inner-city area called Metaxourgio, the article argues that 
a planning tradition of clientelism and spontaneity has been key to the emergence of 
gentrification in Athens. In addition, political networking, policy transfer practices and 
gentrifiers´ topological imagination complete the jigsaw of inner-city socio-spatial 
restructuring. This qualitative research was based on 75 in-depth interviews with city 
planners (3), politicians (4), realtors (3), entrepreneurs (10), gentrifiers (27), lifelong 
residents (13), Roma (2), migrant inhabitants (12) and a teacher (1) in Metaxourgio. 
Every interview was transcribed and coded in accordance with key categories of 
gentrification theories (e.g. income, house prices/restoration costs, land-use change, 
speculation, displacement) and categories which emerged through fieldwork (e.g. 
experience of living abroad, networking, fear, etc.). Research was further supported by 
contextual analysis of urban policy archives (legal documents and regeneration 
proposals); research via web pages and blogs; newspaper and magazine articles; plus in 
situ observation, photographs and mapping of land uses.  
The article proceeds with a look at the broader academic discussion over state 
intervention and the variegated strategies for gentrification, then turns to the city of 
Athens and the ambiguity of its planning system (which actually encourages 
gentrification), before focusing on how gentrification has been promoted in 
Metaxourgio (where the state has laid out its vision of future spatial reinvention by 
launching regeneration proposals, changing land uses and allowing market forces to 
expose the area to cyclical capital speculation). 
Gentrification as strategy and tool of urban ‘revival’ beyond the crisis  
State support for gentrification ranges from policies incentivizing market forces for 
urban restructuring to direct state intervention (Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Lees, 
2012). For example, gentrification in crisis-stricken Mediterranean cities is driven by 
free-market housing policies, accompanied by new entertainment and nightlife uses, 
alternative art and cultural projects, plus tighter control of the public space (Alexandri, 
2014; Janoschka et al., 2014; Semi, 2015). This differs somewhat from the Anglophone 
discourse, which tends to characterize gentrification as state-driven and firmly linked to 
financial operations (Hodkinson, 2011; Watt, 2013; Paton and Cooper, 2016). Often 
gentrifiers have themselves engaged with urban politics, directly facilitating the process 
(Ley, 1996; Smith, 1996; Shaw, 2008).  
Legislative tools promoting gentrification are mostly to do with planning, such as zoning, 
restrictions and sustainable regeneration plans (Lees, 2008; Zukin, 2010), backed up by 
emblematic architecture (González, 2010; Lees, 2012), surveillance tactics (Davis, 1992) 
and economic incentives (Smith, 1996; Hodkinson, 2011). Such interventions facilitate 
the conversion of use values into exchange values, optimize (i.e. render more profitable) 
land use by comparison to pre-existing practice (Smith, 1996) and generate better 
investment opportunities (Beauregaurd, 1986; Ley, 1996). The pioneering euphoria of 
touristic and/or cultural regeneration projects (Harvey, 1989), creative industries and 
people (Porter and Shaw, 2009), slum clearance, brownfield development and the 
promotion of social mix in public housing lies at the heart of revanchist practices of 
gentrification and resultant spatial appropriation.  
Urban policies promoting gentrification are often disguised using a variety of different 
notions: ‘urban regeneration’ in the late 1990s, ‘urban sustainability’ and ‘social mixing’ 
in the 2000s (Lees, 2008) and most recently ‘urban diversity’ (Freeman, 2009). As Lees 
(2008: 2452) observes, such terms ‘are used instead, avoiding the class constitution of 
the processes involved and neutralizing the negative image that the process of 
gentrification brings with it’. The use of terms borrowed from biosciences and 
environmental studies (such as regeneration, diversity and sustainability) serve to 
soften the impact of the process and distract from the issue of displacement. Following 
the neoclassical economic rationale, gentrification is then projected as a ‘rational and 
normal’ outcome of urban evolution. This linear discourse becomes legitimized in public 
discussion, restricting space for theoretical challenges. However, the end result of every 
gentrification initiative is always the socio-spatial purification and class appropriation of 
contested spaces. Hence there is nothing neutral or natural in gentrification, as it 
generates violent (visible and invisible) forms of spatial dispossession and social 
displacement. Gentrification is colonialism at local level (Clark, 2005) and, in each 
individual case, the power politics lurking in the background are as various in time and 
in space as the diverse geographies of gentrification (Lees, 2000; 2012).  
This eccentric flow of capital fuelling gentrification of the built environment is linked to 
systemic crisis (Weber, 2002). By capturing productive forces in fixed forms (such as 
constructions), barriers to further movement of capital are introduced (Harvey, 2007). 
Hence, (re)creation of the built environment serves to perpetuate the crisis into the 
future. It is precisely this ‘creative destruction’ tendency that becomes the driving force 
for the next crisis. Entrepreneurs, realtors and governments are forced to adopt 
innovative ideas and actions, create new needs and discover new places, to facilitate 
capital movement in space and discover new markets, destroying any pre-existing 
structures (Harvey, 1989) and constructing new enclosures, particularly for the middle 
class (Stavrides, 2005; Hodkinson, 2012).  
Socio-spatial restructuring forged by systemic crisis is moreover related to the rescaling 
of the state. National states are being ‘hollowed out’ through the complex replacement 
of state powers by market powers and supranational governance institutions (Keil, 
2003). The state powers are being reshaped at all spatial levels, remaining consolidated 
at the urban level where surpluses and new markets may be produced. In this whole 
rescaling process, the state becomes a social relation bearing the stamp of the 
bourgeoisie (Poulantzas, 2003). The transformations of the capitalist relations of spatial 
production interrelate with the transformations of the elites. The bourgeoisie makes 
use of the state to turn economic and spatial power to their own direction and the state 
serves to organize the dominant classes and disorganize the dominated classes (ibid.). 
The elite’s relationship to the state varies according to the specific interests of the 
faction exercising hegemonic power (Sotiris, 2015). The role of the state guarantees 
hegemony of monopoly capital and the long-term reproduction of the bourgeoisie’s 
interests in a complex process of strategic readjustment (ibid.).  
While the elements of crisis are constantly reproduced in capitalist societies, the genesis 
and rhythms of the crisis must be related to the politics, the class relations and the 
conflicting interests of the ruling classes (Poulantzas, 1976). It is in times of crisis that 
urban strategies are restrained. The state may ‘both transform the social climate that 
surrounds the built environment and institutionalize the climactic changes that are 
thereby imposed on the positions of investors and consumers’ (Zukin, 1989: 150). The 
emerging rent gaps and surplus values are an actual indicator of the state’s ability to 
absorb financial risks and boost speculation (Swygendouw et al., 2002). The initial risks 
inherent in ’regeneration’ are underwritten by the state, while the bourgeoisie enjoys 
the profits. Therein lies the reason why the recreation of space focuses mainly on the 
‘outsider, the investor, the developer businessman or tourist’ (ibid.: 454); state-
sponsored creative destruction underpins ‘capital’s restless search for profits which 
requires constant renewal through galelike forces that simultaneously make way for the 
new and devalue the old’ (Weber, 2002: 522). As Paton and Cooper (2016) shrewdly 
point out, in the post-crash era ‘it’s the state, stupid’ that points, endorses, provokes, 
supports and drives gentrification, in line with the interests of global and local investors 
and elites.  
Even in cases like that of Athens, where gentrification is characterized as privately led 
(Leontidou et al., 2007), the process has been encouraged by state policies. 
As will be discussed subsequently in this article, latent in ‘absent’ state intervention is 
an implicit and nuanced planning strategy which has promoted gentrification in specific 
inner-city neighbourhoods.  
City planning in Athens; in between state and market  
Greek planning is a never-ending process of creation of barely implemented plans, 
addressing urban issues in spasmodic and fragmentary ways (Tsoulouvis, 1996; 
Hadjimichalis, 2014). In post-second world war Athens, urban development and 
construction (of housing) came about largely through assertive self-interest 
(antiparochi)1 and informal settlements (Leontidou, 1989; 1990; Mantouvalou et al., 
1995). Planning laws were promulgated after construction activities had already 
changed the landscape, encouraging spontaneity in city development (Leontidou, 1990) 
and legitimizing speculation in space production (Tsoulouvis, 1987). In the city centre, 
the implementation of the antiparochi system led to the uncontrolled demolition of 
most of the low-rise housing stock and its replacement by sprawling developments of 
high-rise flats; moreover it led to a form of vertical social segregation (Leontidou, 1990), 
with upper- and middle-class households occupying the higher floors and poorer 
residents the lower floors and basements.  
Such urbanism was the outcome of the highly centralized and bureaucratic nature of 
Greece’s formal planning system, which was further linked to ‘the importance of patron-
client relations in Greek politics. Central control of local processes meant that political 
personalities who had access to the government could exercise pressure for the 
extension of the City Plan and the modification of the building regulations to the benefit 
of their clientele’ (Tsoulouvis, 1987: 502). Tolerating illegal private construction and 
public land dispossession became a planning strategy, creating consensus between the 
state and the urbanizing population. Moreover, this tolerance assured political support 
for the dominant political system (Hadjimichalis, 2011; 2014).  
More formal land policy emerged in Greece during the mid-1970s, in anticipation of 
European Economic Community (EEC) accession (Leontidou et al., 2007), while planning 
rescaling in the 1980s and 1990s sought to align with European standards and directives 
in order to obtain access to European funding (Kourliouros, 1997). However, urban 
planning remained highly centralized and tied to physical planning (Tsoulouvis, 1996), 
while reliance on national government funding sustained vertical dependencies for local 
and regional governments (Chorianopoulos, 2012). Even after the most recent (2010) 
state restructuring, although local governments were entrusted with new competencies 
in urban planning and welfare policies, and regional governments with spatial planning 
competencies related to environmental, waste management and public works, central 
control remained intact with detailed planning still a ministerial competency enacted 
by presidential decree (ibid.; moreover see Table 1).  
                                                          
1 Antiparochi refers to a system emergent during the 1950s, whereby housing production was 
negotiated between landowners and small construction companies, with the support of the 
state. 
Against this backdrop of spasmodic fragmentation, bureaucratic centralization and 
clientelism, the most prominent event that introduced neoliberal restructuring into 
planning was the 2004 Olympics (Leontidou et al., 2007). Ad hoc planning frameworks 
were implemented under a ‘state of exception’ for construction projects and 
redevelopments related to the Olympics (Stavrides, 2005), strengthening links between 
the central state and local business elites and international investors, and giving new 
impetus to clientelism (ibid.). The central state passed planning amendments to assure 
profits from works undertaken by a multitude of fragmented agents of the state, local 
authorities and public––private partnerships, while any environmental and social 
consequences were suffered by the local population (Leontidou et al., 2007; 
Petropoulou, 2015). New developments in the centre of Athens, such as metro lines and 
stations, pedestrianized zones, regenerated public spaces and building beautification 
projects,  
Planning 
Jurisdictions 
for the city of 
Athens 
Central Government: 
Ministry of Environment Energy and 
Climate Change L. 4277/2014 
Regional Government 
(Region Of Attica) L. 2494/2011 
Local Government: L. 3852/2010 
Municipality of Athens 
 
 
General 
Competences 
 
 
Spatial development and planning 
organisation: regulation of the 
General Urban Plan of Athens 
Urban regeneration: regulation of 
planning studies 
Integrated regeneration for inner city 
areas with aging, industrial building 
and lack of infrastructures  
 
Environmental Protection, 
Environmental Impact Studies 
and Waste Management 
Management of Parks and 
Sport Facilities 
Planning Studies amending the General 
Urban Plan 
Environmental consultation  
Enactment of car parking spaces 
Composing regeneration planning studies  
Naming streets and squares  
Demolition permits 
Expropriations 
Suspension of store and music license  
Master Plan 
Metropolitan Interventions: 
Reconstruction of the city centre 
(encouragement of cultural routes)  
Plan for Integrated Urban 
Intervention for Athens: upgrading 
of Eleonas and Akadimia Platonos, 
dual regeneration of Alexandras 
Avenue, intervention in 
Panepistimiou Avenue, completion 
of the archaeological walk of 
Athens: connection of Keramikos 
with Eleusina and Akadimia 
Platonos via Plataion and 
Salaminos street. 
 
Preservation of historical and 
cultural  infrastructures, restoration 
of architecturally important 
buildings, regeneration of public 
spaces, redefinition of the land 
uses, preservation proposals for the 
historic centre 
 
Promotion of policies for housing, 
improvement of the city image, 
highlighting of the city centre: 
attraction of new residents and 
businesses, touristic highlighting, 
enhancement of productive 
entrepreneurial, entertainment, 
cultural uses 
Master Plan and the General 
Plan of Athens supervision   
Spatial Planning monitoring   
Building restrictions 
modification   
Appropriations' revocation   
 
Transport, traffic lights, lighting, 
hydraulic works and land 
reclamation management 
 
 
Taxation fees enforcement 
Implementation of regulatory plans, 
Implementation of the General Urban 
Plan, Implementation of planning 
studies,  
Urban redevelopment of problematic 
areas,  Approval of planning 
proposals 
 
 
Environmental protection decision 
Municipal waste management 
 
 
Cemetery and cremation locations  
Table 1 Athens planning jurisdictions 
Moreover, the recent memorandum treaties signed with ‘the troika’ have ensured 
continuity for this ad hoc planning. Privatization of public assets and land, urban 
projects and strategic investments are promulgated using ‘fast track’ procedures, as 
special exceptions to the existing planning framework, facilitating speculation and 
prompt abstraction of surplus values (Hadjimichalis, 2015; Petropoulou, 2015; 
Arampatzi, 2017). The Olympics ‘state of exception’ has thus become a permanent 
political condition of planning, with intensified clientelism plus shadowy negotiations 
between state, investors and hedge funds resulting in ‘justifiable’ dispossessions in the 
name of debt repayment (Lapavitsas, 2013; Kaika and Karaliotas, 2016; Karaliotas, 2016; 
Kaika, 2017; Alexandri and Janoschka, 2018).  
Within this setting of spatial dispossession, gentrification is especially encouraged. It 
has been at the heart of central and local government plans for Athens ever since the 
1980s; it appeared sporadically in the 1990s, intensified during the 2004 Olympics and, 
interestingly enough, has since 2010 developed a rigid spatial form in former working-
class neighbourhoods. The fragmentation of the planning system and the central state’s 
controlling position in urban schemes facilitated the evolution of this process. As Table 
1 shows, most planning competencies for the regeneration and renewal of the centre 
of Athens remain under the jurisdiction of central government, with the Municipality of 
Athens restricted to implementation and consultation roles.  
Before focusing on the planning arrangements established for the area of Metaxourgio 
specifically, a few examples may shed light on why planning credentials in Athens have 
become so complex. Responsibility for some of the city’s major street maintenance falls 
within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MEE)2, i.e. the central 
state. Various avenues and parks are supervised by the Region of Attica (i.e. the regional 
state), while public squares and spaces and the majority of streets fall within the 
jurisdiction of local government. Moreover, the Ministry of Culture (i.e. the central 
state) undertakes cultural regeneration projects to highlight the historic past of the city 
(in other words, attract tourism and disrupt current usage) and the Ministry of 
Economics allocates ’objective’ values in respect of each neighbourhood3, thereby 
influencing the private market. Interestingly, during the recent ‘crisis’ the Ministry of 
Citizen Protection has become more active in urban affairs via socio-spatial cleansing 
projects, especially in ‘deprived’ central areas (the same areas designated for 
regeneration by the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change).  
                                                          
2 Formerly called Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change, and prior to that the 
Ministry of Environment, Planning and Planning Works. 
3 The ‘objective value system’ is a calculation system whereby the state, based on certain 
minimum values for real estate, assigns ‘price zones’ by area. 
However, as Table 1 shows, planning remains a centralized affair, with the majority of 
legislative power in the hands of the central state (the Ministry of Environment, Energy 
and Climate Change), leaving the local state largely with executive powers. It is exactly 
this kind of erratic and highly centralized planning system that provides capital with 
adequate time to reshape central areas for the middle class, simultaneously 
encouraging political networks and maintaining clientelism in spatial (re)production. 
These aspects will be amply illustrated by the Metaxourgio gentrification case.  
Gentrification emergent from a fractured planning system  
Lying to the southwest of the centre of Athens, Metaxourgio’s name (meaning ‘silk’, in 
reference to a nineteenth-century factory which operated there) recalls the working-
class history of the city. Most of its buildings still benefit from exceptional views of the 
Acropolis (the antiparochi system did not entirely transform the area, thanks to 
stagnating land values induced by industrial activity). Building heights are relatively 
modest and a significant part of its stock comprises neoclassical and Bauhaus 
architecture dating from the early twentieth century. The area has nearly 9,000 
inhabitants, with a significantly above-average number of elderly households, migrants 
and Roma. Since the 2000s the Roma population has shrunk due to evictions and 
displacement, while there has been a significant influx of gentrifiers since the mid-
1990s. Unsurprisingly, Metaxourgio has been at the heart of regeneration plans since 
the 1980s.  
- The central state and planning initiatives for the city centre  
As discussed, planning is highly centralized, with the state mandating planning 
jurisdictions right down to the neighbourhood level. Since the late 1980s, various laws 
have focused on the need for regeneration of western parts of central Athens. Laws L. 
567/D/1979 addressing the ‘designation of the traditional part of the city of Athens’ and 
the (more detailed) Athens Master Plan (L. 1515/1985) and the General Urban Plan of 
Athens (L. 80/D/88) (Ministry of Environment, Planning and Public Works, 1979; 1985; 
1988 respectively) highlighted the importance of urban regeneration by changing 
cultural land uses and restoring housing for the beautification of the built environment. 
This legal framework primarily addressed physical factors such as buildings, streets and 
land use, with scant reference to any neighbourhood social context. In most policy 
documents, the district’s ancient name of Keramikos is used in preference to 
Metaxourgio (see Table 1)4.4 The reflected glory of its ancient cemetery serves as a 
better symbol of the revival of the area than any reference to Metaxourgio’s (recent 
and dirty) working-class history.  
                                                          
4 In classical Athens, Keramikos was an area lying both inside and outside the city walls. The 
part of Keramikos outside the city walls was used as an ancient graveyard. The Dimosio Sima 
was that part of the outer Keramikos where important Athenian public figures (among them 
Pericles and other warriors) were laid to rest. 
During the same period, law L. 33/A/84 (Ministry of Economics, 1984) prohibited 
industrial activity in the city centre; in Metaxourgio this ended land use related to 
warehouses, workshops and garages (the backbone of the local economy). By the late 
2000s, the magic of gentrification meant that most former industrial buildings had been 
transformed into leisure uses such as theatres, artistic spaces, tavernas and gourmet 
restaurants; some of the largest were turned into folk-themed nightclubs, often without 
planning permission (Alexandri, 2015). Paraphrasing Zukin (1989: 148), when a 
productive non-productive use like entertainment replaces more productive uses like 
industry, it poses problems related to speculation, rising land values, harassment and 
displacement.  
More explicitly for Metaxourgio, in 1998 a presidential decree (law L.616/D/1998) 
determined ‘land use, specific conditions and building restrictions’. According to this 
legislation, housing was designated as the primary land use; building heights were 
restricted to three floors, while (noisy) land uses affecting housing were banned. But 
why was such a restrictive framework implemented by the central state specifically for 
the neighbourhood of Metaxourgio?  
By 1995, the initial wave of gentrifiers––renowned artists and affluent professionals 
(architects, lawyers, academics, bankers, curators) with access to political networks––
had moved into the area, renovating its low-rise houses. Challenging the stage model 
theory of gentrification (Ley, 1996; Shaw, 2008), the first gentrifiers in this case study 
were middle-class people5 with high economic capital, who had already experienced 
gentrification in Western cities (e.g. New York and London) and enjoyed access to 
political information regarding future upgrading of the area for the 2004 Olympics. 
Already familiar with the process, gentrifiers rushed into Metaxourgio before the 
closure of the rent gap. In many interviews, it was highlighted that 1995 land prices in 
the area were rather low compared to Plaka (which was already gentrifying apace) and 
other inner-city areas, with a low-rise house plus plot of land (circa 230 square metres) 
costing around 55,000 euros.  
As made clear by a well-to-do gentrifier, L. 616/D/1998 would not have been 
promulgated had gentrifiers not mobilized:  
Personally I had a starring role in this case ... we were lobbying the 
ministry and I pushed a lot so that building height limits in the area got 
lowered ... in collaboration with the lawyer advising Simitis6 ... a man of 
great prestige ... we managed to proceed legally ... and certainly the 
                                                          
5 I use the term ‘upper class’ for participants who claimed to earn 3,500–5,000 euros monthly 
income, and ‘middle class’ or ‘creatives’ for those who claimed to earn 1,200–3,500 euros 
monthly income and engage with arts and culture 
6 Kostas Simitis was prime minister of Greece from 1996 to 2004. 
presence of two deputy ministers [helped,] otherwise nothing would 
have happened (Yiannis7, university professor).  
With the state seen as lethargic in direct planning interventions, gentrifiers activated 
political networks, forming a pro-gentrification legal framework favouring their desired 
land uses: low building factors (from 1.4 to max 2.6 corresponding to heights less than 
27 m), green spaces and housing restoration, i.e. establishing specific conditions to 
satisfy their aesthetic sensibilities. The new legislative framework prevented direct 
exploitation of land surpluses via tall antiparochi buildings (that provided high building 
factors of more than 2.4 corresponding to higher buildings up to 32 m), satisfying the 
new order of gentrification. Given that the state is characterized by structural selectivity 
in the way it creates, transforms and builds realities for the fractions of the ruling class 
it so consistently serves (Poulantzas, 1978), only those with access to government can 
exert pressure for changes to the land-use plan (Tsoulouvis, 1987). This selectivity was 
expressed by the promulgation of the L. 616/D/1998 presidential decree, favouring 
elements of the middle class with access to political networks, intensifying speculation 
in the local real estate market and encouraging the difference between the potential 
and the capitalized ground rent (i.e. the rent gap).  
As expressed by a Metaxourgio realtor, after the promulgation of the 1998 presidential 
decree, investors and landowners:  
went completely nuts. They would come and show me the front page of 
Kathimerini8 making claims about future projects … that Lazogkas, Galani, 
Nikolakopoulou9 had moved in to the area … ‘I want 2,000 euros per square 
metre’ ... in Metaxourgio, prices were around 300 euros per square metre; 
they rose to 1,500 euros (Kostas, realtor).  
The state is aware of the planning tools which may be used in order to trigger 
speculation and time is a crucial factor in gentrification (Lees, 2000; 2012). Time as a 
tool (Bauman, 2000b) creates space for more gentrification. The more fragmentary and 
contradictory planning laws are, the more probable it is that they create opportunities 
for those able to use the law as a means of abstracting value from the city (Tsoulouvis, 
1987). In the case of Metaxourgio, this relationship between space, profit and time 
became apparent: in the 1980s, the area was designated for cultural and housing 
regeneration, and by the late 1990s an explicit legal framework had been established. 
The state actually pinpointed the space where the rent gap emerged. Land prices more 
than quadrupled between the mid-1990s and 2007: in the mid-1990s, house prices were 
around 300 euros per square metre; with the announcement of the 1997 presidential 
decree they started rising; by 2007 house prices had reached 1,700 euros per square 
                                                          
7 All names are pseudonyms as interviewees were promised anonymity. 
8 A high-quality national daily newspaper. 
9 A well-known artist, famous singer and renowned composer respectively. 
metre. It should be noted that, for the rest of the city, prices only doubled between 
1993 and 2007 (Simigiannis and Chondrogiannis, 2009). The rise in Metaxourgio land 
values is a clear indicator of the way speculation encouraged gentrification.  
Neighbourhood 
New built Used 
Sales Price 
Price 
Difference 
Sales Price 
Price 
Difference 
City Centre 2011 2008- 2011 (%) 2011 2008- 2011 (%) 
Kolonaki 5.000 -80 3.000 -33,3 
Pagkrati 2.000 -50 1.200 -33 
Ampelokipi 2.000 -35 1.100 -63,5 
Kipseli  2.000 -32,5 900 -72 
Petralona 1.900 -37 900 -66,5 
Gkazi  1.700 -47 900 -22 
Metaxourgio  1.400 -28,5 800 -25 
Table 2 House prices per square metre (in euros) for Athens’ city centre 
neighbourhoods. 
Note: Kolonaki is an inner-city area of affluent households, Pagkrati is a mixed area with enclaves 
of affluence, Ampelokipi and Kyspeli are mixed areas with significant migration, and 
Metaxourgio, Petralona and Gkazi are gentrifying areas.  
Source: Rousanoglou (2012, reproduced by permission of the journal Kathimerini) 
Even for after the 2008 crisis, prices in newly built constructions stabilized at 1,600 
euros per square metre, as gentrification in Metaxourgio acted as a safety net 
preventing a major drop. Relative to other neighbourhoods, the fall in Metaxourgio 
house prices was much more modest. As Table 2 shows, other more affluent areas such 
as Kolonaki, or mixed areas like Ampelokipi, suffered greater decreases than gentrifying 
areas such as Metaxourgio, Gkazi and Petralona. In Metaxourgio, prices (excluding new-
build) dropped by only 25%.  
This decline in real estate prices has favoured middle-class gentrifiers who engage with 
culture and the arts, and began colonizing the area around 2005. The rent gap freeze 
further transformed spaces into cultural hotspots, taking their names from other 
gentrification landmarks such as Kreuzberg; new restaurants and kafenia were named 
after exotic places such as the Seychelles, San Francisco and the Bahamas, indicating 
how the gentrification imaginary is constructed in Athens. Many of these new land uses 
do not have planning permission (e.g. apartments turned into performance spaces, 
backyards into cafes, etc). Moreover, the cultural hype produced by such spaces has 
encouraged social and professional networking amongst newcomers, who then settle 
in Metaxourgio as permanent residents. The relatively low rents of unrestored houses 
and antiparochi apartments have facilitated the inflow of these gentrifiers, who share 
space with friends and colleagues in the area. Echoing the choice of name for the district 
in planning legislation, many gentrifiers say they live in Keramikos: notions of ancient 
Athens better suit their aspirations. Nonetheless, this inflow of artists and cultural 
initiatives has displaced migrants and members of the Roma community, who 
experience harassment and evictions.  
Moreover, in the early 2000s, the Ministry of Civilization embarked on a 
pedestrianization project linking important archaeological sites as part of the city’s 
beautification strategy for the 2004 Olympics. Central to this project was a touristic walk 
through historical areas from the Acropolis to the neighbourhood of Akadimia Platonos 
(Plato’s School), passing the Dimosio Sima (Perikles’ grave site) in Metaxourgio (see 
Table 1). This designation indicated future surplus values and further attracted 
gentrifiers with access to privileged information. As indicated in an interview:  
I always wanted to live in the city centre and in my job I had worked a lot 
there, in planning structuring for the Olympics, so 13 years ago we decided 
to buy this house and we moved in (Io, architect).  
The expectations created by preparations for the Olympics, as well as access to 
privileged information regarding upcoming redevelopment projects, facilitated 
gentrification. The relevant legislation and announcements were similar to those 
pertinent to the gentrification of the Plaka neighbourhood (by the Acropolis) in the late 
1980s. Such proclamations for Metaxourgio created high hopes for a similar gentrifying 
future, especially among those familiar with the process. Moreover, during this period, 
64 neoclassical and Bauhaus buildings were listed as buildings of architectural 
importance by the Ministry of Civilization. As well as intensifying gentrification trends, 
this also led to the desertion of historic buildings, as lifelong owners who could not 
afford to undertake the restoration work specified by law abandoned their homes. 
Eventually, incidences of arson in old buildings allowed their owners to claim exception 
from the law (interview with lifelong resident). But abandonment and fire risks go hand-
in-hand with gentrification, as the outflow of poorer inhabitants creates investment 
opportunities for wealthier people, as ’populations move or are forced to move in 
reverse directions and both contribute to displacement’ (Marcuse, 1986: 171). 
Since the 2010s, the crisis has further exacerbated neglect of the city centre. The 
minister formerly heading the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change 
announced new initiatives in the Athens Master Plan targeted at returning the middle 
class to the city centre via tax incentives (Eleftherotypia, 2010; see Table 1). Carefully 
chosen wording articulated the gentrification vision among dominant political circles. 
Multiple combinations of words beginning with ‘re’––such as re-use, re-think, re-launch 
and rehabilitate the city centre––were copiously applied. Against a backdrop of the city 
centre as a collapsing space, gentrification was hailed as the cure for the crisis disease. 
The objective was to lure pioneering couples and individuals, creative people who can 
’leverage the city centre’ (Kaltsa, 2011), i.e. attract the gentrifiers.  
The Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change, in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Economics, implemented economic incentives for the further rehabilitation 
of Metaxourgio. These consisted primarily of tax reductions for the restoration and 
rehabilitation of dilapidated buildings (a tax deduction of 80% of rehabilitation costs 
over a decade for restoring/rehabilitating a house or shop), reduction of conveyance 
tax to 3% (instead of the 10% rate applicable elsewhere in the city) and tax exemptions 
for restoration costs (equivalent to 20% up to 3,000 euros and 10% between 3,000 euros 
and 6,000 euros). Once again, gentrifiers were pivotal in the establishment of this 
planning initiative. Upper-class gentrifiers using the services of Oliaros, a prominent 
realtor active in the area, formed a non-profit organization called Protypi Geitonia 
(Model Neighbourhood)10. They become aware that:  
The ministry was planning the improvement of the city centre but 
Metaxourgio was not in the plans, so we pushed by sending proposals 
about what we wanted to do and how, collected signatures ... we decided 
that Metaxourgio should get the same tax incentives ... as there was 
potential here (Maria, Oliaros executive secretary).  
Under gentrifier pressure, the state declared Metaxourgio a redevelopment zone 
eligible for special incentives. It is interesting to note the gentrifiers’ growing influence 
on the formation of planning initiatives in times of crisis; financial incentives were for 
those with the economic capacity to get on with the rehabilitation of buildings, i.e. the 
gentrifier population. Poorer households were excluded from tax breaks, as they did 
not meet the income requirements laid down in law. Nor could they take advantage of 
the economic incentives for building restorations, as they lacked the initial capital.  
The announcement of these incentives was accompanied by intensified policing in 
Metaxourgio’s public spaces. Arrests of undocumented migrants increased, serving to 
purify the area of ’unwanted others’. In times of crisis, any police attempts at social 
cleansing seem justified, regardless of the brutality inflicted upon ’unwelcome’ groups. 
After all, key to the success of urban intervention in degraded areas is ensuring it via 
security monitoring and the creation of a safe environment (Davis, 1992). In 
Metaxourgio, police surveillance contributed to displacement of the most vulnerable 
groups, undertaken by the state in compliance with gentrifiers’ requirements.  
                                                          
10 Oliaros owns 4% of Metaxourgio’s building stock. 
Local government and regeneration  
The Municipality of Athens has limited (primarily executive) planning jurisdiction. Since 
the 1990s, however, it has published regeneration studies for decaying inner-city areas. 
Its 1993 Metaxourgio study emphasized the need for cultural regeneration. The 
proposal comprised planning suggestions on street pedestrianization, building 
restoration and incentives to attract younger households. As argued by the planner in 
charge, the process of regeneration had specific ingredients: 
Firstly, land uses that degrade the area must be removed ... for example in 
the United States ... holistic regeneration of an area was achieved within 20 
years ... you can turn a desert into the most upgraded area, so that even 
the richest person in Philadelphia aspires to ... a town house in Society Hill 
... [In] the beginning who arrived in the area? Young couples and people 
who upgraded buildings on their own ... then the state proceeded with 
incentives ... so within 20 years there is completion (Dimos, planner).  
In its quest for the ideal gentrification formula, the municipality employed a US-trained 
planner, an expert on inner-city regeneration (i.e. gentrification). Seeking to transfer 
policies in this way presumes that something similarly successful will occur in a different 
context (McCann, 2011). However, as González (2010) indicates, local practitioners who 
may not be directly active in any policy transfer take part in broader consensus-making 
and construction of hegemonic ideas. Ten years after the publication of the 
regeneration study, the local government proceeded with partial implementation of the 
proposals via pedestrianization, tree planting and partial beautification of the built 
environment (e.g. the neighbourhood’s central square has been regenerated three 
times since). The regeneration study and associated media publicity, together with the 
1998 presidential decree and inner-city interventions for the Olympics, enforced 
gentrification. As explained by a gentrifier working at the municipal radio station:  
I knew that there were plans for regeneration of the area. I work in the 
media, and this was no secret (Markos, journalist).  
Topological imagination (Robinson, 2011) regarding future upgrading turned 
regeneration expectations into another gentrification driver. In the Athenian context, 
the time that elapsed between local government’s initial regeneration plans in the early 
1990s and the mid-2000s was a catalyst for the establishment of the process.  
The state has plans in its drawers that can complete the area ... the most 
important intervention was the municipal gallery ... the square had already 
been regenerated ... houses were bought and restored, inhabited by people 
of high cultural index (Alkis, city councillor).  
Twenty years later, by the late 2000s (i.e. the crisis years), the Municipality of Athens 
had adopted a more proactive approach to regenerating Metaxourgio. In 2010, the 
former silk factory became the municipal gallery, enacting another proposal from the 
1993 regeneration study. As indicated in the interview (as per above extract) with a local 
councillor from the (conservative) party ruling the city for many years up until 2010, the 
state is fully aware of the mechanisms available for the stimulation of the real estate 
market: the regeneration of a square and an emblematic project may indeed serve to 
channel gentrification. After 2010, the newly elected (social democrat) mayor catered 
specifically for the interests of both local gentrifiers and Oliaros. Gentrifiers, frustrated 
that regeneration remained incomplete, undertook several beautification projects with 
the support of the municipality. For example, their gardening initiatives were provided 
with municipal services, tools and soil; the regeneration of Dimosio Sima was 
encouraged by the municipal cleaning department and received radio coverage; and an 
ample supply of recycling bins and sustainable lighting technology was readily made 
available. It is noteworthy that gardening initiatives by residents in non-gentrifying 
areas (e.g. Exarchia and Patisia) were dealt with by the state using tear gas, surveillance 
and arrests; by contrast, assets in the form of sustainable lighting technology and 
recycling bins are provided primarily for the more privileged inner-city areas (e.g. 
Kolonaki and Koukaki). 
Since 2013, the Municipality of Athens has promoted several projects seeking to 
’restart’ Athens, such as ‘Re-launch Athens’, which focuses on the physical regeneration 
of ‘downgraded’ inner-city areas. The promotion of such projects creates a broader 
societal consensus, helping to resolve the abstract problem of conflicts arising between 
particular and general interests (Jessop, 1983). Within the ‘Re-launch Athens’ project, 
planning proposals drafted by Oliaros for the cultural regeneration of Metaxourgio 
(comprising specialized housing and creative entrepreneurial usage clusters) were 
promoted via the European Commission Jessica Project11. As the mayor stated at a city 
council meeting:  
We must applaud the fact that, through this project, people will find jobs 
and this area, no matter how problematic, will be regenerated ... Have we 
realized that the country is collapsing? Every day people lose their jobs. The 
public state, be it the central state or local government, is dead, it is 
bankrupt. We will go on with investments so that people can find jobs, so 
that there is regeneration of the city, especially now that we are in such bad 
shape (George Kaminis, mayor of Athens, quoted in Municipality of Athens, 
2012).  
Lurking discreetly behind the local government rhetoric advocating re-launch projects 
is the notion of gentrification. Gentrification is endorsed as a prime opportunity to 
                                                          
11 A European Commission initiative, developed in co-operation with the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) and the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), the ‘Joint European Support for 
Sustainable Investment in City Areas’ project supports sustainable urban development and 
regeneration through financial mechanisms. 
collaborate with the private sector––especially important now that the state is ‘dead’. 
It is in times of crisis that capital is invited to restructure the built environment without 
the impediment of planning restrictions. Against the backdrop of a fragmented planning 
system in a state of exception, tolerant of speculation and compliant to the will of the 
dominant class, private initiatives are portrayed as the only way to revitalize local 
economies. Then again, restrictive discussions relating planning to economic indicators 
may only encourage further speculation and abstraction of surpluses from space. The 
mainstream rhetoric of a city in crisis favours economic initiative and investment above 
all other considerations; any newsworthy sum related to investment effectively 
disqualifies any sum of numbers revealing the extent of impoverishment, displacement, 
unemployment and lack of social welfare. And in this setting, gentrification is effectively 
driven forwards.  
Conclusion  
Within hegemonic gentrification discourses, the state occupies centre-stage as the key 
actor orchestrating and driving the whole process. The case of Athens highlights the 
need for a re-examination of this Anglophone positioning, indicating the difference and 
variegation at play in state intervention. The continuous interrelation between 
contiguous direct legislation and indirect spatial practice, allowing discrete clientelism, 
creates a scenario of alleged non-action or ‘absence’ which creates the grounds for 
gentrification. This nuanced implicit interplay ultimately generates another continuum 
of state action comprising a panorama of indirect complex planning acts and legislation. 
But such legislative practice may chiefly be the outcome of pressure upon and control 
of the state by individual elites; hence the existence of gentrification may not only be 
the outcome of direct state action but also of state––elite interaction.  
The state acts as a continuous apparatus of spatial domination exercised by elites. It 
facilitates gentrification through strategies ranging from non-action to direct 
intervention (reflecting the specificities of each case) as part of a broader societal 
strategy of class domination. But as the state is selective in its strategies, it satisfies the 
needs of elements of the middle class (Poulantzas, 1978) with gentrification aspirations. 
Even non-action by the state, or absence of direct intervention, is a phenomenon 
forming part of this conflicting structure of the state. Non-action has proven to be 
important for the maintenance of unity and organization of power blocs (ibid.). As 
Lefebvre (1996: 375) put it, ‘the production of space is carried out with the state’s 
intervention and the state mutually acts in accordance with the aims of capital ... What 
actually happens is that this vicious circle is set in train which for all its circularity is an 
invasive force serving dominant economic interests’.  
Within this framework, the space of the city is produced by social and power relations 
emergent amongst diverse social groups and institutions. Against the backdrop of the 
Athens planning system, with its spasmodic implementation and clientelism, 
gentrification emerges from the fractures. It is the very vagueness of the legal 
framework together with the predominant allocation of planning powers to the central 
state which perpetuates such erratic planning performance. The tolerated phenomenon 
of speculation (which formerly extracted value from the city through the antiparochi 
system) has now becomes a chief component of gentrification. The elapsing of time 
thanks to non-state actions produces laissez faire conditions for the reproduction of 
space and gentrification. Realtors and gentrifiers restructure space without any major 
restrictions. New urban conditions are developed in accordance with specific middle-
class predilections, dispossessing lifelong residents and migrants, displacing Roma and 
poorer households. Neighbourhoods are reconstructed through new land uses, 
buttressed by the state. Does the non-action of the state comprise another strategy of 
socio-spatial restructuring? Reflecting on the way actual planning practices is mixed 
with clientelism and how speculation in space is celebrated as a new investment 
opportunity in Athens, yet another geography of gentrification may lie before our eyes. 
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